Nationalist Frames Erode Opposition to Violent Hate Crimes

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Public opinion of hate crimes may be malleable because these acts are understood through victims' varying social identities. We investigate whether violent attacks provoke different reactions when framed around victims' national rather than religious identities. We first document media coverage of hate crimes, showing that more than 20% of anti-Jewish hate crimes are covered using nationalist frames. We then analyze discourse surrounding a high-profile anti-Jewish attack and demonstrate the prominence of nationalist framing. In two nationally representative survey experiments, we show widespread aversion to religiously motivated violence, but greater ambivalence toward attacks motivated by nationalism. Specifically, opposition to physically violent attacks against Jews weakens when framed through the victim's support for Israel rather than their religious identification. Similarly, opposition to attacks on Muslims and Hindus declines when linked to Palestinian and Indian nationalism, respectively. While Americans display near-universal opposition to religious bigotry, nationalist frames erode public condemnation of identity-based violence.

Why are some hateful acts universally denounced while others are mired in debate and denial? The answer may hinge on how a victim's identity and actions are framed. While hate crimes are defined by a victim's social group, individuals hold multiple identities—such as religion and national origin (*1–3*). Does emphasizing a political or nationalist dimension of a victim's identity over a religious one alter public opposition to violence?

The contemporary debate over antisemitism is a powerful illustration of this dynamic (*4–9*). The number of reported anti-Jewish hate crimes in the U.S. surged by 63% from 2022 to 2023, and they made up roughly 70% of all reported religiously motivated hate crimes in 2024 (*10–12*), yet public discourse frequently contests whether such acts constitute religious bigotry or political expression related to the state of Israel. Consequently, accusations of antisemitism are often dismissed as politically motivated (*13–18*). This ambiguity highlights a persistent challenge in the study of antisemitism, and of prejudice generally, which is observational equivalence: speech and acts that may be motivated by hatred toward a demographic group can be difficult or impossible to distinguish from identical speech and acts with wholly different origins. Criticism of the actions of Israel, for example, may be rooted in a hatred of Jews, but could also simply reflect opposition to government policy (*18, 19*).

Rather than attempting to disentangle these motivations, we investigate the empirical prevalence and consequences of this ambiguity by asking whether opposition to violent attacks against religious minorities shifts depending on how such events are framed. To illustrate the phenomenon, we first document how the media frames hate crimes in the post—October 7 period using a systematic analysis of news coverage. Though the majority of headlines highlight victims' religious identification, 21.9% of headlines about anti-Jewish hate crimes feature a nationalist framing. By comparison, 9.5% of headlines referencing anti-Muslim attacks are framed in nationalist terms. We then analyze media coverage and elite commentary surrounding a specific high-profile anti-Jewish attack, the murder of two Israeli Embassy staffers outside of a Jewish Museum in May 2025. We select this case for closer scrutiny because it exemplifies the core attributes of the phenomenon under study and demonstrates how these features manifest in media coverage. Specifically, both the staffers' affiliation with the state of Israel—which does not appear to have been known to the assailant—and their Jewish identity figure prominently in the killings, giving news outlets and elected officials discretion over how to frame the event. Analyzing multiple datasets containing

news coverage of the attack, we show that nationalist rhetoric was extremely common (upwards of 50%), and sometimes more prevalent than language emphasizing Jewish identity and antisemitism in the news media. However, elected officials tended to focus on religious affiliation/antisemitism or both frames.

We then measure the impact of differential framing using two large, nationally representative survey experiments. In addition to enabling causal inference, these experiments enhance precision by allowing us to more clearly specify the attackers' motivation, an attribution that is not consistently made in media coverage. In the first, we presented respondents with descriptions of targeted acts of physical violence, experimentally varying only whether the Jewish victims were identified by religious symbols (e.g., wearing a kippah) or nationalist ones (e.g., carrying an Israeli flag). We find that shifting the frame from religious to nationalist significantly erodes opposition to the attack and increases ambivalence, demonstrating the effect of this rhetorical choice. With rare exception, we do not find that nationalist framing increases support for violent attacks. Rather, nationalist framing appears to move respondents from opposition to ambivalence: religiously motivated attacks are met with near-universal disapproval, but many people hesitate to condemn interpersonal violence if it is associated with a nationalist cause or identity.

This phenomenon does not, however, appear unique to antisemitism. We demonstrate the generality of this mechanism by replicating the experiment for attacks on Muslims (framed via Palestinian nationalism) and Hindus (framed via Indian nationalism), finding a consistent erosion of opposition in both cases. These findings reveal that nationalism can serve as a potent rhetorical shield for interpersonal violence. By reframing hate crimes, discourse can corrode the broad social consensus required to protect vulnerable minority groups in a pluralistic society.

Framing effects and public attitudes toward hate crimes

Support for political violence is generally low, but it is neither zero nor inconsequential (*20, 21*). A measurable share of the public approves of violent hate crimes. For example, a recent survey found that 5% of Americans deemed the way Hamas carried out the October 7, 2023 attack on Israeli civilians as acceptable, though a much larger share, 21%, said they were not sure whether it was acceptable (*22*). In the United States, nearly two percent of the public are willing to support

partisan murder (*23*), though support is conditional on the traits of the attacker and the victim (*24*). Prior research finds that significant shares of the German population approve of anti-refugee hate crimes, and that radical right voters actually prefer candidates who endorse such violence (*25*).

Support for both hate crimes and politically motivated violence is likely malleable, contingent on how information about such acts is presented—a phenomenon known as a framing effect (*26–29*). By emphasizing certain dimensions of an issue over others—for example, casting a Ku Klux Klan rally as a matter of free speech rather than public safety—communicators can significantly alter public tolerance for hate groups and their activities (*30*). While the literature on framing and prejudice is vast, fewer studies have examined how framing affects public attitudes toward specific, violent hate crimes (but see (*7, 31*)). This is a critical gap, as some share of the public is willing to condone such violence, and attitudes toward hate crimes can be influenced by political discourse and radical right rhetoric (*25, 32, 33*).

The potential for framing effects to alter attitudes may be especially high for hate crimes because the motive behind an attack is often ambiguous and contested (*34*). Victims frequently hold multiple overlapping identities, creating alternative explanations for why they were targeted. Attacks against Jews, for instance, often prompt debates over whether victims were targeted for their religion or their perceived political support for Israel (*35*). This ambiguity offers news organizations and other commentators rhetorical discretion, especially when perpetrators do not express a motive: an attack can be framed as an act of religious bigotry or as political violence. Our study is designed to test the consequences of this choice. We begin by illustrating empirically how the media and elected officials chose to frame attacks on religious minorities, before evaluating the impact of these rhetorical decisions on attitudes toward hate crimes.

How hate crimes are covered in the media post 10/7

We begin by documenting the scope of hate crimes since the October 7, 2023 Hamas-led attack in Israel, and how the media covered these hate crimes (Figure 1). We compiled incident counts from the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program's incident-level hate crime records, restricting to offenses on or after October 7, 2023 classified as Anti-Jewish, Anti-Islamic (Muslim), or Anti-Hindu. All events in our dataset were only categorized with one of these labels. While hate

crime data have well-known limitations in terms of accurate and consistent measurement of the concept (*36*), they are useful for the purpose of describing how the media reacts when a hate crime is reported. To measure news coverage, we searched Google News RSS feeds for each unique event by bias type, city, and state within a two-week window surrounding the incident date. Many returned headlines concerning unrelated national stories rather than the specific local incident, so we used a large language model (GPT-5.4) to assess relevance: each headline was evaluated against the incident details (date, location, bias type, offense) and retained only if judged to be about that particular event. A second LLM classification step then assigned each retained headline to one of four framing categories—*Nationalist Only* (national, ethnic, or geopolitical conflict), *Religious Only* (religious identity or religion-based hate), *Both*, or *Neither*—based on the overall framing of the headline rather than keyword matching alone (see SI Table 4 for human validation of LLM classifications).



Figure 1: **Hate crime incidents, news coverage, and headline framing for Anti-Jewish, Anti-Muslim, and Anti-Hindu bias crimes occurring after October 7, 2023.** Panel A shows incident counts from FBI UCR data. Panel B shows the number of news articles and distinct events covered, after LLM-based relevance filtering. Panel C shows the distribution of media framing across four categories, as classified by a large language model. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals (Poisson for counts; normal approximation for proportions).

FBI data record 2,888 Anti-Jewish incidents in this period, alongside 348 Anti-Muslim and 32 Anti-Hindu incidents—roughly an 8:1 ratio of Anti-Jewish to Anti-Muslim crimes (Figure 1A). The volume of news coverage follows a similar ordering: Anti-Jewish hate crimes appear in 2,048 validated articles spanning 628 distinct events, Anti-Muslim crimes in 200 articles spanning 56 events, and Anti-Hindu crimes in just 7 articles across 2 events (Figure 1B). On a per-incident basis, however, Anti-Jewish crimes are covered at a higher rate (0.71 articles per incident versus 0.57 for Anti-Muslim), a gap of about 25%. More striking is the difference in how these crimes are framed (Figure 1C). Religious-only framing is the most common for both groups, but it appears in 80.0% of Anti-Muslim headlines compared with 63.3% of Anti-Jewish headlines. The difference is largely accounted for by nationalist framing: 10.7% of Anti-Jewish headlines use a nationalist frame alone and another 11.2% combine nationalist and religious frames, for a total of 21.9% with some nationalist content. The corresponding figures for Anti-Muslim headlines are 2.5% and 7.0%, totaling 9.5%. Headlines about Anti-Jewish hate crimes are thus more than twice as likely to reference geopolitical themes—Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and related conflicts—than headlines about Anti-Muslim crimes, where coverage is overwhelmingly situated within a religious-bias frame. In short, news organizations frame otherwise similar acts of bias-motivated violence in different ways depending on the target group, with Anti-Jewish crimes far more likely to be placed in a geopolitical context.

Our analysis focuses on religiously motivated hate crimes (anti-Muslim, anti-Hindu, and anti-Jewish). The FBI classifies anti-Arab crimes separately; there were 193 such incidents and 17 associated news articles during our study period. Including these events does not alter our conclusions.

How are attacks on Jews framed? A case study.

As with much interpersonal violence, the true motives behind hate crimes are often unclear and debated. Some observers have described high-profile anti-Jewish attacks as a form of "political violence" in response to Israel's actions in Gaza, and indeed perpetrators often claim this as their motive explicitly. Others insist these acts are antisemitic, citing the fact that assailants often target strangers who are perceived to be Jewish and whose affiliation with, or feelings toward, Israel are

unknown.

As a spate of recent high-profile attacks on Jews has demonstrated, this ambiguity offers news outlets and elites discretion over how to frame violent attacks against religious minorities. Perhaps no attack better exemplified this dynamic than the murder of Sarah Milgrim and Yaron Lischinsky outside the Capital Jewish Museum in May 2025. Milgrim and Lischinsky, who were staffers for the Israeli Embassy in D.C., were gunned down while exiting an event organized by the American Jewish Committee. The alleged perpetrator, Elias Rodriguez, has since been indicted on federal hate crime and murder charges. While being apprehended, Rodriguez reportedly told police, "I did it for Palestine, I did it for Gaza" (*37*). There is no evidence Rodriguez knew of the couple's affiliation with the Israeli Embassy or was targeting them in particular (*38*), meaning the attacker could have simply been trying to harm people he believed to be Jewish. Nevertheless, the couple did have direct ties to the Israeli government. The event thus offers the chance to study how media outlets choose to frame anti-Jewish attacks when national and religious identity both feature prominently.

News coverage

We quantify the prevalence of two frames in media coverage and discussion of the murders: an Israeli frame (national identity) and a religious frame (religious identity). To evaluate these framing decisions, we assembled and analyzed three datasets of media content relating to the murders of Milgrim and Lischinsky, which we define as documents containing the words "Yaron Lischinsky": (1) the set of all news articles generated by the top 25 U.S. newspapers (by circulation; $N =$ 187 documents); (2) the set of news articles published by the local newspaper estimated to have the highest circulation in each state ($N = 189$ documents); (3) the set of all English-language news articles available in the LexisNexis database ($N = 714$ documents). After removing identical headlines (the same article published by multiple outlets) we have a final sample of 838 headlines.

To measure the prevalence of nationalist and religious frames, we used OpenAI's GPT-5.4 to classify the headlines of each article (see SI section A.2 for the prompt; SI Table 4 reports human validation of the LLM classifications). Turning first to the headlines of these documents, we find that nationalist framing is either roughly as prevalent as religious framing, or far more prevalent, depending on the dataset analyzed (see Figure 2). Using the Top 25 U.S. newspapers, we find that 50.7% of headlines were framed in nationalist terms relative to 51.3% framed in religious terms

($p > .05$ on difference). Similarly, in the largest newspapers in each state, nationalist and religious framing were equally prevalent at 42.9% each ($p > .05$). In our sample of LexisNexis articles, however, nationalist framing was substantially more prevalent than religious framing by nearly 20 percentage points ($p < .05$). Though the differences are not always statistically significant, these results suggest that nationalist framing is at least as common as religious framing, even when the event in question offers discretion over which framing to choose.

We also computed the share of each set of headlines that contained only one of the terms, both, or neither. Between 10.7% and 16.0% of headlines included both, between 32.1% and 41.3% used only a nationalist term, and between 21.5% and 35.3% used only the religious term. Finally, between 14.0% and 25.0% of headlines made no mention of either set of terms.



Figure 2: **Analysis of headlines in news articles on D.C. murders of Israeli Embassy staffers.** The figure displays the share of headlines from each data source containing a term associated with nationalist framing, a term associated with religious framing (including mentions of antisemitism) and combinations of the two. Nationalist framing is estimated to be more common. See SI A.3 for an analysis with an alternate dictionary, which shows even starker differences. We use the Wilson score interval (*39*), which adjusts the center of the confidence interval toward 0.5 and is non-symmetrical around the point estimate.

Headlines, while most prominent in the presentation of an article, only capture a short summary of a story. We next measure if and where religious or nationalist framing first appears in the full text of an article. To do so, we used an LLM to classify each sentence in every article as containing nationalist framing, religious/antisemitic framing, both, or neither. We then identified the normalized position (0 = beginning, 1 = end) of the first sentence with each frame type.

Table 1 shows that in all cases where a headline included a nationalist frame, the first religious/antisemitic sentence in the article text was approximately 2-7 times farther into the text than

when the headline itself used religious framing. Moreover, unlike religious/antisemitic framing, which first appears around 2-5% into an article's text when the headline is religious, the first nationalist sentence in an article appears much earlier—in the first 2% of an article's text across all sources (see SI Section A.5).

For example, in articles containing a religious frame in the headline in the Top 25 largest newspapers, the first religious/antisemitic sentence appears, on average, 5% of the way into the text. In articles containing a nationalist frame in the headline, the first religious/antisemitic sentence appears 9% of the way in—nearly twice the distance from the top of the story. The corresponding gaps in the large state newspaper and LexisNexis data are often much larger. Because people often only read a headline and, potentially, the beginning of an article, these analyses suggest that many news consumers may have never encountered a sentence relating to Judaism or antisemitism, even though the event took place at a Jewish museum, was organized by a Jewish institution, and one of the victims was Jewish.

Category	Top 25 American Position (%)	Largest by State Position (%)	LexisNexis Position (%)
Nationalist	0.09 (97.2%)	0.11 (98%)	0.13 (98.6%)
Religious/Antisemitic	0.05 (100%)	0.02 (100%)	0.02 (100%)
Nationalist Only	0.11 (96.1%)	0.12 (97.5%)	0.17 (98.2%)
Religious/Antisemitic Only	0.06 (100%)	0.01 (100%)	0.02 (100%)
Nationalist and Religious/Antisemitic	0.05 (100%)	0.07 (100%)	0.02 (100%)
Neither	0.22 (100%)	0.21 (95.8%)	0.19 (97%)

Position: 0 = beginning, 1 = end; % = percent with position data

Table 1: **Normalized position of first religious/antisemitic sentence by headline classification.** This table shows the normalized position (0 = beginning, 1 = end) of the first sentence classified by an LLM as containing religious/antisemitic framing, given the headline classification of the article. Percentages show the percent of articles containing a religious/antisemitic sentence anywhere in the text within each headline classification. Percentages less than 100% indicate that some articles contained no religious/antisemitic framing.

For the largest newspapers, headlines framing the murders as only nationalist were associated

with significantly larger reach on X than headlines with only a religious frame: 1.6 times the views, 4.0 times the likes, 88.9 times the reposts, and 1.6 times the comments. However, variation was large, and average engagement was low across all headlines. See SI A.6 for further details.

While this descriptive analysis focuses on coverage and commentary around a single anti-Jewish attack, the competing frames of nationalism and religious identity are ubiquitous in media accounts and discussion of violent attacks against Jews. Weeks after a firebombing at a protest in Boulder, Colorado calling for the release of Israeli hostages, one of the Jewish victims, Karen Diamond, succumbed to her injuries. *The New York Times* headline for the story covering Diamond's death read, "Victim of Boulder Firebombing Attack Dies of Wounds," and mentioned "marchers for Israeli hostages" in the sub-headline, but made no mention of Judaism or antisemitism (*40*). In contrast, CNN's headline read, "A woman injured in the Boulder antisemitic attack has died, prosecutors say," (*41*). A similar dynamic characterized coverage of arson at Pennsylvania Governor Josh Shapiro's house. After the attack, which occurred just hours after Shapiro had hosted a Passover Seder, the suspect made reference to the governor's alleged treatment of Palestinians. These features gave the media discretion in how to frame the crime (*42, 43*). Sometimes the tension between these frames is itself the subject of public discourse (*44, 45*).

Elite commentary

Elected officials are a second important source of framing. Their public statements shape media narratives and reach large audiences directly through social media, making elite framing choices consequential for how the public understands violent events (*28, 29*). We assessed how federally elected officials engaged with the murders by querying all X posts, newsletters, and floor speeches from all sitting U.S. Senators and Representatives from America's Political Pulse (*46*). We identified all content mentioning the victims of the DC killings on the day of and day after the killings. We then reviewed each to ensure they were about the attack.

The contrast with media coverage is striking. While about three fifths of federal legislators commented on the attack, two fifths said nothing. Among the 369 comments we identified, the vast majority engaged with the religious/antisemitic frame (44% exclusively) or used both frames (48%). Only 29 comments (8%) exclusively used the nationalist frame. Recall that in media headlines, nationalist framing appeared in roughly half of all coverage. Elected officials thus over-

whelmingly chose to emphasize the religious dimension of the attack that the media frequently omitted or subordinated. (See SI B.) [1]

Yet even the small share of nationalist-only elite messages could reach audiences far exceeding mainstream news coverage. Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) posted "I am appalled by the killing of two Israeli embassy employees in Washington last night and grateful for the quick response from law enforcement. We must all absolutely condemn this heinous act. Violence must have no place in politics." This single post—which made no mention of Judaism, antisemitism, or a Jewish museum—received 689k views on X, more than 60% of the views accumulated by all articles published by the Top 25 American Newspapers and the Largest Newspapers in Each State combined (498k). It also received 5.5k likes, 723 reposts, and 1.9k comments. The example illustrates how a handful of nationalist-framed elite messages can, through the amplification dynamics of social media, expose more people to a nationalist frame than the combined reach of traditional news outlets.

We do not infer intent on the part of authors of the content we analyze. Indeed, there is good reason to mention Israel in this coverage: both victims were employees of the Israeli Embassy. However, this analysis does demonstrate that when covering and discussing an event in which both identities were salient, news editors and elites often used their discretion to highlight national identity, sometimes exclusively. Moreover, the amplification of nationalist-framed messages through social media means that public exposure to this frame likely exceeds what headline counts alone would suggest. This raises a natural question: how does such framing affect public attitudes? We investigate this in the following section.

The Impact of Nationalist Framing of Hate Crimes

What is the impact of media framing that emphasizes national identity over religious identity on public attitudes toward hate crimes? To find out, we conducted two experiments. The first was an

[1] We also analyzed what traits (party, gender, ideology, age, and chamber) relate to making a statement, and a specifically framed statement. After applying a BH multiple testing correction we find that older elected officials were less likely to message at all and to use the religious frame. Senators were more likely to message and to use a religious frame (see SI section B.1).

exploratory pilot and the second pre-registered.[2] In both surveys, we examine whether approval of hate crimes changes when physical attacks are framed in religious vs. nationalist terms.

Experiment 1

The first survey was fielded December 12–19, 2024 with the firm Bovitz Forthright. The sample ($N = 2,507$) was quota sampled to be nationally representative based on age, gender, race/ethnicity, education, and region (Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). Previous research has measured support for political violence (*33, 47*) and hate crimes targeting majority-Muslim refugees (*25, 48*), but we know less about the public's attitudes towards anti-Jewish attacks and whether they are subject to framing effects.[3]

Design Respondents were presented with texts about anti-Jewish hate crimes and randomly assigned to a control condition, a religious treatment, or a nationalist treatment with equal probability (1/3). The control condition read, "An organization has published statistics showing that hate crimes against Jews, such as physical attacks, have increased significantly in the US over the last several years." Respondents assigned to the religious and nationalist treatments also read the text contained in the control condition, but with additional text indicating that the attack occurred while the victim was: i) wearing traditional religious garb outside a synagogue (religious condition) or ii) carrying an Israeli flag and discussing Israel as the Jewish homeland (nationalist condition; see Materials and Methods for full text).

To study framing effects as they operate in contemporary media settings, we developed these treatments to maximize external validity: they closely mirror the features and media coverage of recent violent attacks on Jews. The text of the religious treatment describes an attack on attendees of a synagogue and of a man wearing traditional Jewish garb, which occur frequently around the world (*49, 50*). Likewise, the text of the nationalist treatment aligns closely with the language of

[2] For the preregistration see https://aspredicted.org/b6zk-3vjz.pdf.

[3] This study was not pre-registered, and was conducted as an exploratory pilot. Here, we present the conditions (applied to 50% of the sample) that we replicate in Study 2 (both studies were approved by institutional review boards at Dartmouth and Princeton). The results are substantively similar when we include all conditions. SI Section C.4.1 presents results with all data, which added information about the organization collecting hate crime statistics and produces similar results, as well as for two other questions measuring views about hate crimes.

media reports describing the June 2025 firebombing in Boulder, Colorado.[4] Following the treatment, respondents were then asked whether they "support or oppose attacks like these," and given the response options: strongly support, support, neither support nor oppose, oppose, strongly oppose.

The treatments deliberately bundle features as they co-occur in real-world settings (*52*). The religious treatment describes victims identified by passive markers (wearing a kippah, entering a synagogue), whereas the nationalist treatment describes victims engaged in political expression (carrying a flag, voicing support for a homeland). Because these features co-vary in real-world media frames—nationalist coverage almost invariably describes political activity (rallies, protests, statements), whereas religious coverage foregrounds personal markers (clothing, attendance at houses of worship)—this bundling captures the frames whose effects we seek to estimate. We return to the interpretive implications of this design choice in the Discussion.

The distinction between religious and nationalist motives has shaped both media coverage and public debate about anti-Jewish attacks. However, it is possible that it similarly impacts attitudes about violence targeting Muslims, attacks against whom have also increased significantly.[5] To examine this possibility, we also included parallel treatments that feature Muslims as victims. The religious treatment references mosque attendance and the hijab, while the nationalist treatment invokes Palestinian statehood (see Materials and Methods).

Note that our primary goal is to assess how different frames impact views about hate crimes, holding the victimized group constant. That is, we do not assume that other aspects, such as conflict dynamics or degrees of nationalism, are uniform across groups. For example, we do not suggest that Muslims relate to the Palestinian cause in the same way as Jews relate to the Zionist cause, or that the public perceives these groups or affiliations in the same way. Likewise, given different historical contexts and political realities, we do not assume that the nationalism treatments convey the same grievances or evoke identical reactions.

[4] A *Washington Post* story on the attack recently stated, "Assistant U.S. Attorney Melissa Hindman stressed that Soliman told FBI agents he chose to target the Boulder group Run for Their Lives because they were carrying Israeli flags" which is very similar to the text in our nationalist treatment (*51*).

[5] See https://www.justice.gov/crs/news/2023-hate-crime-statistics for FBI statistics.

Results Overall, very few respondents support anti-Jewish hate crime—3.4% in the control condition. However, we observe a significant degree of ambivalence, with 9.2% saying they neither support nor oppose the acts. And while clear majorities oppose hate crime, not all do so strongly, suggesting some degree of potential malleability (see SI Section C.2).

Do these views change depending on the framing of anti-Jewish assaults? The left panel of Figure 3 displays average responses to our question measuring opinion of the violent attack described in the intervention. Although levels of support do not shift, framing an attack in nationalist rather than religious terms leads to an 8.17-percentage point decrease in opposition to hate crime (95% CI [0.79, 15.56]). Importantly, as opposition erodes, ambivalence rises by roughly the same amount. Responses in the nationalist condition were also statistically different from those in the control condition, but we see little difference between the religious and control conditions. (See SI Table D.3 for full numeric results.)

To probe whether this phenomenon might apply to other groups, we also tested whether nationalist v. religious framing affected support/opposition for anti-Muslim attacks. The right panel of Figure 3 shows a very similar pattern, with a nationalist framing again lowering opposition to the attacks by 8.33 percentage points ($p < .05$). We also find no change in support ($p > .05$). However, in the case of anti-Muslim attacks, we observe no statistically significant change in ambivalence relative to the religious condition ($p = .057$).

We note that after applying a correction for multiple comparisons, the effects in Study 1 do not reach statistical significance at conventional levels (BH-adjusted p-value $= .07$ in all cases; see SI Table 23). However, as we show in the next section, these results cleanly replicate in a higher-quality sample with preregistered comparisons, alleviating concerns about false positives.

Overall, these results are consistent with the idea that public concern about anti-Jewish attacks diminishes when such attacks are framed in nationalist terms. Comparable patterns apply to anti-Muslim attacks in the context of opposition to pro-Palestinian advocacy.

One concern may be that respondents provide answers they perceive to be socially desirable. Prior research demonstrates that social desirability bias is weaker in online surveys compared to face-to-face or phone interviews (*53,54*). Importantly, even when present, such bias aligns with the theoretical object of interest: the willingness to openly express condemnation when constrained by social norms is itself central to assessing public responses to hate crimes (*55,56*). If social desirabil-

ity bias is partly driving these responses, our findings point to a troubling normative environment in which nationalist violence against civilians is more likely to go unopposed.

Next, we build on these findings in two ways. First, we investigate robustness by replicating the experiment with a different sample. Second, we explore whether heightened tolerance for nationalist hate crime is unique to the Israel-Palestine conflict or reflects a broader indifference toward nationalist versus religious violence across minority groups with salient nationalist associations.



Figure 3: **Views about Hate Crimes Reported in Study 1.** Means and 95% confidence intervals (robust standard errors). Annotated differences are between nationalism and religious treatments.

Experiment 2

Design The second survey was a pre-registered nationally representative survey fielded with YouGov ($N = 2,000$, March 14–27, 2025).[6] This survey contains the same three conditions as Survey 1. In addition to Jews and Muslims, it includes treatments applied to Hindus (e.g. attacks on Hindus framed as anti-Hindu or anti-Indian). We include this group to test whether differences in framing shape views on violence when the victim group is not linked to the Israel-Palestine conflict. To benchmark these views, we further add a control condition that refers to anti-minority attacks without specifying the targeted group. In total, there are 10 conditions to which respon-

[6]The YouGov survey was pre-registered here https://aspredicted.org/b6zk-3vjz.pdf.

dents are randomly assigned with equal probability. The experimental conditions are displayed in Materials and Methods; the dependent measure of approval remains the same.

As in Experiment 1, support for violence remains negligible, and overwhelming majorities oppose it (see SI D.2). However, there is some variation depending on the victim group. In the control conditions containing neither nationalist nor religious frames, opposition peaks at 89% when no group is specified, but declines to 85% for assaults against Jews, 84% for anti-Hindu attacks, and 81% when Muslims are targeted, though these differences are not significant.

Next, we assess whether approval varies by the suggested motivation of the assault. Figure 4 displays mean responses across all conditions. Consistent with Experiment 1, respondents are less troubled by intergroup violence when it is carried out in the name of nationalism as opposed to religion. Figure 4 also confirms that these relationships hold across a diverse set of victim groups. Nationalist framings of assaults reduce opposition and foster ambivalence, whether targets are Jews, Muslims, or Hindus. With respect to anti-Jewish attacks, opposition declines by 8.5 points (95% CI [0.9,16.10]) when hate crime targets expressions of Zionism rather than religious faith—roughly the same magnitude as the effect in Study 1. Similar dynamics play out among Muslim and Hindu victims—providing nationalist framing reduces opposition toward anti-Muslim attacks by 20.19 points (95% CI [11.16,29.22]) and anti-Hindu attacks by 13.16 points (95% CI [4.12,22.20]).

Additionally, nationalist justifications cause greater *support* for hate crimes in the case of Muslims. Framing assaults around the Palestinian cause rather than around religious symbols leads to a 10.27-point increase (95% CI [4.74,15.79]) in support for physical attacks targeting Muslims. These differences in effect sizes may reflect sample composition, survey timing, or other unobserved factors; additional replications could provide insight into their sources and effect stability. We note that all statistically significant effects of nationalism v. religion treatments remain significant after a multiple testing correction (this correction was not pre-registered. See SI Table 37).



Figure 4: **Views about Hate Crimes Reported in Study 2.** Means (weighted) and 95% confidence intervals (robust standard errors). Dotted lines and shaded regions show mean responses and associated confidence intervals for control condition where no specific group is mentioned. The annotations show the mean difference and associated 95% CI for nationalist and religious treatments.

Collectively, these results reveal a tendency toward reduced opposition to violence against civilians when it is tied to nationalism. While our findings help shed light on a specific case—the polarization over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the U.S.—their relevance across victim groups may also reflect a more general inclination to tolerate interpersonal violence when attributed to nationalist motives.

Discussion and Conclusion

Debates over whether the recent rise in anti-Jewish violence stems from antisemitism or anti-Israel sentiment are bound to persist. But regardless of whether political opposition to Israel is the true cause of these attacks, our study demonstrates that describing such attacks in nationalist terms—a frequent practice in media coverage and elite discussion—erodes opposition to identity-based violence. Our analysis of post–October 7 news coverage shows that nationalist framing is not a hypothetical concern: more than one in five headlines about anti-Jewish hate crimes invoke geopolitical themes, compared with fewer than one in ten for anti-Muslim crimes. The media landscape

we document—in which anti-Jewish hate crimes are disproportionately placed in a geopolitical context—is precisely the environment in which the framing effects we measure would operate at scale. Moreover, we find evidence that this phenomenon may be general: people appear to be less opposed to acts of interpersonal violence against religious minorities, on average, when they are framed in nationalist terms.

There are several possible mechanisms for the patterns we observe. Wars between nations are socially sanctioned methods of violent conflict, at least under certain conditions (e.g. self-defense (*57, 58*)). While the attacks described in our experiments occur off the battlefield, it is possible that framing them in terms of nationalism activates attitudes typically applied to state-level conflicts, thereby making the acts appear less objectionable. Relatedly, it is also possible that the presence of a foreign flag described in the nationalist treatment signals dual loyalty on the part of the victim, rendering them less sympathetic to some share of respondents. A third possibility pertains to the U.S. context. The protection of religious freedom is a cornerstone of American democracy. Americans may therefore be especially sensitive to religiously based violence compared to citizens from other countries. Adjudicating these mechanisms is beyond the scope of this project. Regardless of the mechanism, the practical impact is the same: nationalist frames erode opposition to acts that would otherwise be more widely viewed as indefensible.

A related design consideration is that the religious and nationalist treatments differ not only in the identity dimension they emphasize but also in the nature of the victim's described behavior: wearing religious garb is a passive identity marker, whereas carrying a flag and voicing support for a state are acts of political expression. Some share of the effect we observe may therefore reflect reduced sympathy for victims perceived to be engaged in political advocacy rather than a response to nationalism as such. We note, however, that this bundling mirrors the real-world phenomenon our study documents: nationalist markers in media coverage of hate crimes are almost always accompanied by descriptions of political activity (rallies, protests, statements), whereas religious markers are typically passive (clothing, attendance at houses of worship). Our treatments thus estimate the effect of frames as they actually appear in the media landscape. Nonetheless, future experimental designs could use passive nationalist cues—such as a flag lapel pin or bumper sticker—to decompose the contributions of political expression and nationalist identity to the erosion of opposition we observe.

Materials and Methods

Study 1 Treatments

Control

An organization has published statistics showing that hate crimes against [Jews / Muslims], such as physical attacks, have increased significantly in the US over the last several years.

Control text + Religious Treatment

For example, [Jews / Muslims] have been physically attacked as they enter a [synagogue / mosque] or because they wear a [kippah, a traditional Jewish head covering / hijab, a traditional Muslim head covering].

Control text + Nationalist Treatment

For example, [Jews / Muslims] have been physically attacked because they carry [an Israeli / a Palestinian] flag or for saying that [Israel should exist as a homeland for the Jewish people / what is now Israel should exist as a homeland for the Palestinian people].

Study 2 Treatments

Control – no specified group

An organization has published statistics showing that hate crimes against minority groups, such as physical attacks, have increased significantly in the US over the last several years.

Control

An organization has published statistics showing that hate crimes against [Jews / Muslims / Hindus], such as physical attacks, have increased significantly in the US over the last several years.

Control + religion treatment

For example, [Jews / Muslims / Hindus] have been physically attacked as they enter a [synagogue / mosque / temple] or because they wear a [kippah / hijab / bindi], a traditional [Jewish / Muslim head covering / Hindu dot painted on the forehead].

Control + nationalism treatment

For example, [Jews / Muslims / Hindus] have been physically attacked because they carry [an Israeli / Palestinian / Indian] flag or for saying that [Israel should exist as a homeland for the Jewish people / what is now Israel should exist as a homeland for the Palestinian people / India should exist as a homeland for Hindus].

Outcome question:

Do you support or oppose attacks like these?

1. Strongly support
2. Support
3. Neither support nor oppose
4. Oppose
5. Strongly oppose

Support was coded as 1 if the respondent selected “Strongly support” or “Support.” Ambivalent was coded as 1 if the respondent selected “Neither support nor oppose.” And oppose was coded as 1 if the respondent selected “Strongly oppose” or “Oppose.”

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Data and materials availability: Data and scripts to replicate the experimental, elite and media analyses are available on the Open Science Framework.[7] Note that we provide the headlines for LexisNexis data which is sufficient to rebuild the datasets. We cannot distribute the raw text of the LexisNexis articles.

Supplementary materials

[7] https://osf.io/ezkjv/?view_only=aa12c302f89c4270bdb90e72a30a4daf

Appendix: Nationalist Frames Erode Opposition to Violent Hate Crimes

Rafaela Dancygier Jonathan Mummolo Sean J. Westwood

A Media Analysis

We explore how the media covered the killings of Yaron Lischinsky and Sarah Milgrim.

A.1 Samples

We collected three samples of news articles:

1. LexisNexis: All articles on LexisNexis that mention Yaron Lischinsky.
2. Top 25 American Newspapers (by circulation): All articles published by the top 25 American newspapers that mentioned Yaron Lischinsky.
3. Largest Newspaper in Each State (by circulation): All articles publsihed by the largest newspapers in each state that mentioned Yaron Lischinsky.

A.1.1 LexisNexis

We found 714 articles from 132 unique sources.

Table 1: Article Counts by Source: LexisNexis

Source	Articles
ABC News Transcript WORLD NEWS TONIGHT WITH DAVID MUIR 6:36 PM EST	1
ABC News Transcript WORLD NEWS TONIGHT WITH DAVID MUIR 6:41 PM EST	1
As It Happens 6:30 PM EST CBC RADIO ONE	1
Associated Press International	3
Associated Press State & Local	3
Atlanta Journal Constitution Online	1
CBC (News)	2
CBS News Transcripts CBS EVENING NEWS 6:30 PM EST	2
CBS News Transcripts CBS MORNINGS 7:00 AM EST	3
CBS News Transcripts CBS MORNINGS PLUS 9:00 AM EST	3
CBS News Transcripts CBS NEWS MORNINGS 4:00 AM EST	4

Continued on next page

Table 1 – *Continued from previous page*

Source	Articles
CBS News Transcripts CBS NEWS SUNDAY MORNING 9:00 AM EST	1
CBS News Transcripts CBS SATURDAY MORNING 7:00 AM EST	1
CE Noticias Financieras English	151
CNN ANDERSON COOPER 360 DEGREES 8:00 PM EST	1
CNN CNN THIS MORNING 6:00 AM EST	1
CNN ERIN BURNETT OUTFRONT 7:00 PM EST	1
CNN INTERNATIONAL CNN NEWSROOM 12:00 AM EST	1
CNN INTERNATIONAL CNN NEWSROOM 1:00 AM EST	4
CNN INTERNATIONAL CNN NEWSROOM 2:00 AM EST	1
CNN INTERNATIONAL CNN NEWSROOM 3:00 AM EST	1
CNN INTERNATIONAL CNN'S AMANPOUR 1:00 PM EST	1
CNN INTERNATIONAL CONNECT THE WORLD 10:00 AM EST	1
CNN INTERNATIONAL CONNECT THE WORLD 9:00 AM EST	3
CNN INTERNATIONAL ISA SOARES TONIGHT 2:00 PM EST	2
CNN INTERNATIONAL ONE WORLD WITH ZAIN ASHER AND BIANNA GOLODRYGA 11:00 AM EST	2
CNN INTERNATIONAL ONE WORLD WITH ZAIN ASHER AND BIANNA GOLODRYGA 12:00 PM EST	3
CNN INTERNATIONAL QUEST MEANS BUSINESS 4:00 PM EST	1
CNN INTERNATIONAL THE BRIEF WITH JIM SCIUTTO 6:00 PM EST	1
CNN Inside Politics 12:00 PM EST	1
CNN Inside Politics 12:30 PM EST	1
CNN News Central	10
CNN THE SITUATION ROOM 10:00 AM EST	2
CNN THE SITUATION ROOM 10:30 AM EST	1
CNN THE SITUATION ROOM 11:00 AM EST	1
CNN THE SITUATION ROOM 11:30 AM EST	1
CNN The Lead with Jake Tapper 5:00 PM EST	1
CNN The Lead with Jake Tapper 6:00 PM EST	3
CNN Wire	9
CQ Transcriptions	4
CTV Television, Inc. CTV NATIONAL NEWS 23:00:00 ET	1
Calgary Sun	1
Canadian Press	11
Central Florida Future: University of Central Florida	6
Chicago Daily Herald	3
Congressional Documents and Publications	21
Creators Syndicate	1
Edmonton Sun	1
Fox News FOX NEWS @ NIGHT 11:00 PM EST	1
Fox News FOX NEWS SUNDAY 9:00 AM EST	1
Fox News FOX SPECIAL REPORT WITH BRET BAIER 6:00 PM EST	2
Fox News INGRAHAM ANGLE 7:00 PM EST	1
Fox News MEDIA BUZZ 11:00 AM EST	1
Fox News SUNDAY NIGHT IN AMERICA 9:00 PM EST	1

Continued on next page

Table 1 – *Continued from previous page*

Source	Articles
Fox News THE FIVE 5:00 PM EST	2
Fox News THE STORY WITH MARTHA MACCALLUM 3:00 PM EST	1
Fox News THE WILL CAIN SHOW 4:00 PM EST	1
LNP (Lancaster, PA)	1
Laura Coates Live	1
Los Angeles Times	4
Los Angeles Times Online	3
MENAFN - Business & Finance News (English)	1
MORNINGS WITH MARIA MORNINGS WITH MARIA 6:00 AM EST	2
MORNINGS WITH MARIA MORNINGS WITH MARIA 7:00 AM EST	1
NBCNEWS.com	5
New York Daily News	4
Newstex Blogs	48
Newsweek.com	9
Ottawa Sun	2
PBS NewsHour (formerly The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer) PBS NEWS HOUR 6:00 PM EST	2
PR Newswire	1
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette	3
Politico.com	1
Postmedia Breaking News	14
Power and Politics 5:00 PM EST CBC NN	1
Pressherald.com	2
RealClearPolitics	1
Roll Call Photos	1
Salon.com	1
St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri)	3
States News Service	54
Stratford Beacon-Herald	1
TVEyes - BBC Radio 2	1
TVEyes - BBC Radio 4	1
TVEyes - BBC Radio 5 Live	1
Tampa Free Press	6
Targeted News Service	32
Telegraph Herald (Dubuque, IA)	3
The Associated Press	2
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution	2
The Baltimore Sun	6
The Bismarck Tribune	3
The Calgary Herald (Alberta)	1
The Center Square	3
The Daily Caller	8
The Dartmouth: Dartmouth College	1
The Deseret News	2
The Dose 9:00 PM EST CBC-NN	2

Continued on next page

Table 1 – *Continued from previous page*

Source	Articles
The Gazette (Montreal)	3
The Hartford Courant	5
The Morning Call	2
The New Republic (Online)	1
The New York Times	34
The Pantagraph (Bloomington, Illinois)	2
The Peninsula Gateway (Gig Harbor, Wash.)	1
The Salt Lake Tribune	1
The Source with Kaitlan Collins	1
The Spun	1
The Toronto Star	3
The Week US	3
TheHill.com	26
Toronto Sun	12
Tribune-Review (Greensburg, PA)	3
UPI	2
US Fed News	3
USA Today	2
USA Today Online	12
USNEWS.com	3
United Nations News English	1
User Name: =	2
Waterloo Region Record (Ontario)	1
West Side Spirit (New York, New York)	1
Windsor Star (Ontario)	1
Wisconsin State Journal (Madison, Wisconsin)	1
World Report 8:00 AM EST CBC Radio One	1
thestar.com	1
Total	660
Unique Sources	126

A.1.2 Top 25 American Newspapers

We found 187 articles from the top 25 American newspapers. We excluded video stories, newsletters and running updates.

Table 2: Article Counts by Source: Top 25 American Newspapers

Source	Articles
Chicago Tribune	5
Daily News	3
Hartford Courant	2
Honolulu Star-Advertiser	1
Houston Chronicle	2
Las Vegas Review-Journal	1
New York Post	47
Newsday	4
Orange County Register	2
South Florida Sun-Sentinel	7
The Boston Globe	5
The Dallas Morning News	1
The Denver Post	3
The Los Angeles Times	4
The Minnesota Star Tribune	7
The New York Times	17
The San Diego Union-Tribune	2
The Seattle Times	1
The Wall Street Journal	12
The Washington Post	12
USA Today	12
Total	150

A.1.3 Largest Newspaper in Each State

We identified 189 articles from 38 newspapers. In 12 states we found no coverage of the event by the largest newspaper.

Table 3: Article Counts by State: Largest Newspaper in Each State

State	Articles
Alabama	1
Alaska	2
Arizona	1
Arkansas	3
California	4
Colorado	4
Connecticut	7
District of Columbia	14
Florida	1
Georgia	1
Hawaii	1
Idaho	9
Illinois	6
Indiana	1
Kansas	2
Maine	2
Maryland	9
Massachusetts	6
Minnesota	3
Missouri	4
Montana	1
Nebraska	1
Nevada	2
New Hampshire	2
New York	25
Oklahoma	2
Oregon	1
South Carolina	1
Texas	2
Utah	1
Washington	1
Total	120
Unique Sources	31

A.2 Analysis (LLM)

We used OpenAI's GPT-5.4 to classify the headlines in our dataset into four categories: nationalist only, religious only, both, and neither. Headlines from the three source-level datasets (Top 25 Newspapers, Largest Newspaper in Each State, and LexisNexis) were each classified with an individual API call. Headlines from the broader hate crime news coverage dataset were classified in batches grouped by event. Both approaches used the following core system prompt:

```
You are an expert research assistant specializing in media framing
   ↪and content analysis. Your task is to analyze a news article
   ↪headline about a violent event and classify the framing used.

**Background and Definitions:**

You will classify content based on two primary, non-exclusive
   ↪frames. A single headline can contain one, both, or neither
   ↪frame.

1. **Nationalist Frame:** This frame presents the event primarily
   ↪through the lens of national, ethnic, or political conflict,
   ↪especially when the violence is framed in relation to
   ↪intergroup conflict, nationalism, territorial struggle, or
   ↪geopolitics.
   * **Key Concepts:** nationality, ethnicity, state actors,
      ↪political conflict, territory, diplomacy, nationalism,
      ↪communal conflict tied to national or ethnic identity.
   * **Examples of concepts:** "India," "Indian," "Pakistan,"
      ↪"Pakistani," "Hindu nationalist," "Muslim separatist,"
      ↪"Kashmir," "border tensions," "Israel," "Israeli,"
      ↪"Palestine," "Palestinian," "Gaza," "West Bank," "Zionist,"
      ↪"Hamas," "pro-Palestinian," "pro-Israel"
   * **Example Usage:** headlines that emphasize political struggle,
      ↪nationalism, state conflict, territorial conflict, or
      ↪ethnic-national identity over religion itself.

2. **Religious Frame:** This frame presents the event primarily
   ↪through the lens of religious identity, religious prejudice, or
   ↪hate-motivated violence targeting a religious group.
   * **Key Concepts:** religious identity, anti-religious bias, hate
      ↪crimes, bigotry, sectarian prejudice, religiously motivated
      ↪violence.
   * **Examples of concepts:** "Muslim," "Islam," "Islamic,"
      ↪"Islamophobia," "anti-Muslim," "mosque," "Hindu,"
      ↪"Hinduism," "anti-Hindu," "temple," "Jewish," "Jewish
      ↪community," "antisemitic," "antisemitism," "synagogue,"
      ↪"religious hate crime"
   * **Example Usage:** headlines that emphasize that victims or
      ↪targets were Jewish or Muslim, or that the violence is being
      ↪treated as antisemitic, Islamophobic, or religion-based hate.
```

```
**Important Guidance:**
- Focus only on the **headline**.
- Do **not** rely on simple keyword matching; classify based on the
   ↪overall framing.
- A headline may be:
  - **"Nationalist"** if it frames the event mainly around national,
     ↪ethnic, territorial, or political conflict.
  - **"Religious"** if it frames the event mainly around religious
     ↪identity, religious bias, or hate crime.
  - **"Both"** if it clearly foregrounds both political/national
     ↪conflict and religious prejudice or identity.
  - **"Neither"** if neither frame is clearly present.

Return a JSON object with the structure:
{"frame_classification": "<Nationalist|Religious|Both|Neither>"}
```

For source-level classification, each headline was submitted individually with the following user message:

```
Classify the following headline:

{headline}

Return JSON: {"frame_classification": "..."}
```

For event-level batch classification, all headlines for a given event were submitted together. The system prompt was identical except for the output format instructions, which were replaced with:

```
You will be given multiple headlines to classify. Return a JSON
   ↪object with a "classifications" array, where each element has
   ↪the structure:
{"index": <int>, "frame_classification":
   ↪"<Nationalist|Religious|Both|Neither>"}

The array must have one entry per headline, in order.
```

The corresponding user message was:

```
Classify each of the following headlines:

0. [headline 1]
1. [headline 2]
...

Return JSON: {"classifications": [{"index": 0,
   ↪"frame_classification": "..."}, ...]}
```

A.2.1 Validation

To assess the reliability of the LLM classifications, we validated the model's outputs against human-coded labels. Overall accuracy was 0.894. Weighted precision was 0.918 and weighted recall was

0.894. Table 4 reports precision and recall by class.

Table 4: LLM Classification Validation: Precision and Recall by Class

Class	Precision	Recall
Both	0.981	0.757
Nationalist	0.945	0.825
Neither	0.560	0.933
Religious	0.949	0.929
Overall (weighted)	0.918	0.894

In the modern era local newspapers are highly dependent on wire services and reports from other newspapers. Deduplicating headlines gives us a final dataset of 838 headlines.

A.2.2 Tabular Results

Table 5: Frame Classification Percentages by News Source

Source	Neither	Both	Religious Only	Nationalist Only	Religious	Nationalist
Top 25 American	14.0%	16.0%	35.3%	34.7%	51.3%	50.7%
Largest by State	25.0%	10.7%	32.1%	32.1%	42.9%	42.9%
LexisNexis	22.8%	14.4%	21.5%	41.3%	35.9%	55.7%

Dataset	P-value
Top 25 American Newspapers	0.9084
Largest Newspaper in Each State	1
LexisNexis	0

P-values from two-sample t-tests
comparing Nationalist vs Religious classifications

A.3 Analysis (Keywords)

As an alternative to the LLM classification we use keywords to assess the headlines. We deployed a minimal standard for assessing if an article's headline was positioned as nationalistic or religious. We ran a case-insensitive and stemmed search for nationalistic terms "Israel," "Palestin" and "Gaza" and religious terms "Jew" and "semiti." Note that, for example, "Palestin" would match both Palestinian and Palestine and "semiti" would match both "anti-Semitism" and "antisemitic."

We identified articles whose headline included a religious or nationalist term, a nationalist but not religious, religious but not nationalist, or both.

For all articles we also identified the position in the text where the a religious keyword first appeared. Because articles varied in length, we normalized this result by the article's total word count.

A.4 Tabular Results

Table 6: Keyword Category Frequency For Headlines

Category	Top 25 National		Largest by State		LexisNexis	
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
Has Nationalist	72	48%	50	41.67%	359	54.39%
Has Religious	75	50%	56	46.67%	215	32.58%
Nationalist Only	51	34%	40	33.33%	280	42.42%
Religious/Antisemitic Only	54	36%	46	38.33%	136	20.61%
Nationalist and Religious/Antisemitic	21	14%	10	8.33%	79	11.97%
Neither	24	16%	24	20%	165	25%

A.5 First Occurrence of Nationalist Framing

Expanding on our analysis of where religious/antisemitic framing first appears in article text, we repeat this task for nationalist framing. The differences are stark, with the first nationalist sentence occurring much earlier in the texts of articles.

Table 7: Nationalist Keyword First Occurence

Category	Top 25 American Position (%)	Largest by State Position (%)	LexisNexis Position (%)
Nationalist	0.02 (100%)	0.02 (100%)	0.02 (100%)
Religious/Antisemitic	0.07 (98.7%)	0.08 (98.2%)	0.10 (97.7%)
Nationalist Only	0.02 (100%)	0.02 (100%)	0.02 (100%)
Religious/Antisemitic Only	0.09 (98.1%)	0.09 (97.8%)	0.15 (96.3%)
Nationalist and Religious/Antisemitic	0.01 (100%)	0.02 (100%)	0.02 (100%)
Neither	0.06 (100%)	0.16 (95.8%)	0.17 (98.2%)

Position: 0 = beginning, 1 = end; % = percent with position data

A.6 Social Media Reach

Because we had URLs for each article in the Top 25 American Newspapers and Largest Newspaper in Each State datasets we were able to, with the X api, identify when each article was posted, how many views each post received, and how many likes, reposts and comments were recorded. Here we do not depublicate as each article, even if identical to another article in content, was posted to X with a different URL.

Table 8: Total Engagement Metrics by Dataset

Dataset	Views	Likes	Reposts	Comments
Top 25 American Newspapers	599,983	4,158	589,881	970
Largest Newspaper in Each State	76,676	149	226	56

As expected, the state-level newspapers received significantly less traction on all measures of reach. The top national newspapers received nearly 7 times more views, 26 times more likes, 2,201 times more reposts, and 17 times more comments.

Table 9: Mean Engagement by Keyword Category: Top 25 American Newspapers

Category	Views	Likes	Reposts	Comments
Has Nationalist	4,779	43	8,124	8
Has Religious	2,327	9	4,126	4
Nationalist Only	6,554	60	5,451	10
Nationalist and Religious/Antisemitic	468	2	14,617	1
Neither	3,801	19	101	7
Religious/Antisemitic Only	3,050	11	47	5

Table 10: Mean Engagement by Keyword Category: Largest Newspaper in Each State

Category	Views	Likes	Reposts	Comments
Has Nationalist	95	0	0	0
Has Religious	1,110	2	3	1
Nationalist Only	119	0	0	0
Nationalist and Religious/Antisemitic	0	0	0	0
Neither	407	2	2	0
Religious/Antisemitic Only	1,352	2	4	1

B Elite Engagement

Table 11: Message Categories: Religious/Antisemitism vs Nationalist by Party (May 21-22, 2025)

Category	Democrat	Republican	Total
Both	89	90	179
Religious/Antisemitism Only	102	59	161
Nationalist Only	12	17	29
Total	203	166	369

B.1 Predicting Elite Engagement

Table 12: Statement Response Type by Party

	Religious Language	Nationalist Language	Both	Messaged
(Intercept)	0.62^{***}	0.37^{***}	0.33^{***}	0.65^{***}
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Republican	-0.16^{***}	-0.02	-0.03	-0.14^{**}
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Independent	-0.62	-0.37	-0.33	-0.65
	(0.35)	(0.34)	(0.33)	(0.35)
R^2	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.02
Adj. R^2	0.02	-0.00	-0.00	0.02
Num. obs.	538	538	538	538

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 13: Statement Response Type by Ideology

	Religious Language	Nationalist Language	Both	Messaged
(Intercept)	0.54^{***}	0.36^{***}	0.31^{***}	0.58^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
GGUM Ideology	-0.02^{*}	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
R^2	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01
Adj. R^2	0.01	-0.00	-0.00	0.00
Num. obs.	532	532	532	532

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 14: Statement Response Type by Chamber

	Religious Language	Nationalist Language	Both	Messaged
(Intercept)	0.50^{***}	0.35^{***}	0.30^{***}	0.54^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Senator	0.22^{***}	0.05	0.08	0.19^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
R^2	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.02
Adj. R^2	0.03	-0.00	0.00	0.02
Num. obs.	538	538	538	538

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 15: Statement Response Type by Age

	Religious Language	Nationalist Language	Both	Messaged
(Intercept)	0.54^{***}	0.36^{***}	0.32^{***}	0.58^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age	-0.00^{**}	-0.00^{*}	-0.00^{*}	-0.00^{**}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
R^2	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02
Adj. R^2	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01
Num. obs.	538	538	538	538

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 16: Statement Response Type by Gender

	Religious Language	Nationalist Language	Both	Messaged
(Intercept)	0.52^{***}	0.38^{***}	0.33^{***}	0.56^{***}
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Woman	0.07	−0.07	−0.06	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
R^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Adj. R^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Num. obs.	538	538	538	538

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 17: Bivariate Regression Results with Benjamini-Hochberg Correction

Outcome	Predictor	P-Value	BH Adj. P	Significant
Religious Language	Party	0.0773	0.1654	No
Religious Language	Gender	0.1401	0.2155	No
Religious Language	Ideology	0.0416	0.1188	No
Religious Language	Age	0.0023	0.0145	Yes
Religious Language	Position	0.0000	0.0009	Yes
Nationalist Language	Party	0.2794	0.3725	No
Nationalist Language	Gender	0.1317	0.2155	No
Nationalist Language	Ideology	0.6096	0.6096	No
Nationalist Language	Age	0.0202	0.0782	No
Nationalist Language	Position	0.3413	0.3792	No
Both	Party	0.3215	0.3782	No
Both	Gender	0.1892	0.2703	No
Both	Ideology	0.4544	0.4783	No
Both	Age	0.0235	0.0782	No
Both	Position	0.1056	0.1921	No
Messaged	Party	0.0618	0.1546	No
Messaged	Gender	0.2988	0.3735	No
Messaged	Ideology	0.0827	0.1654	No
Messaged	Age	0.0029	0.0145	Yes
Messaged	Position	0.0006	0.0063	Yes

C Study 1

C.1 Sample Demographics

Table 18: Study 1: Demographic Descriptives (Jewish Target Condition)

Category	Percentage
Age	
Mean Age	48.2
Education	
Less than High School	4.6%
High school graduate/GED	37.5%
Some college	21.3%
2-year College Degree	10.2%
4-year College Degree	17.8%
Post-graduate Degree	8.7%
Family Income	
Less than $10,000	7.9%
$10,000-$19,999	11.4%
$20,000-$29,999	12.7%
$30,000-$39,999	11.2%
$40,000-$49,999	9.5%
$50,000-$59,999	9%
$60,000-$69,999	4.9%
$70,000-$79,999	6.4%
$80,000-$99,999	3.4%
$100,000-$119,999	4.4%
$120,000-$149,999	9.1%
$150,000-$199,999	3.9%
$200,000-$249,999	1%
$250,000-$349,999	1%
$350,000-$499,999	0.4%
$500,000 or more	0.1%
Prefer not to say	3.7%
Gender	
Male	49.5%
Female	48.9%
Other	1.6%
Hispanic	
Yes	18.2%
No	81.8%
Party ID	
Republican	28.4%
Democrat	37.7%
Independent	30.5%
Other	3.4%
Race	
White	64.8%
Black	13.7%
Hispanic	10.3%
Asian	5.4%
Native American	1%
Middle Eastern	0.2%
Other	0.9%
Value 9	3.7%

C.2 Response Distributions

Table 19: Distribution of Attack Response by Treatment: Jewish Target (Percentages)

Response	Control	Religious	Nationalist
Strongly Oppose	1.9	2.4	1.9
Oppose	1.5	0.5	1.4
Neither Support nor Oppose	9.2	11.1	18.8
Support	13.6	9.6	14.4
Strongly Support	73.8	76.4	63.5

Table 20: Distribution of Attack Response by Treatment: Muslim Target (Percentages)

Response	Control	Religious	Nationalist
Strongly Oppose	1.0	1.9	3.9
Oppose	2.9	1.4	1.0
Neither Support nor Oppose	15.0	12.6	19.4
Support	19.4	24.6	23.8
Strongly Support	61.7	59.4	51.9

C.3 Tabular Results

Table 21: Study 1: Treatment Effects on Attack Response Types (Jewish Target)

	Oppose	Ambivalent	Support	Scale
Intercept	0.861*	0.111*	0.029*	1.428*
	[0.813; 0.908]	[0.068; 0.153]	[0.006; 0.052]	[1.307; 1.549]
Control Treatment	0.013	−0.018	0.005	0.014
	[−0.052; 0.079]	[−0.077; 0.040]	[−0.029; 0.039]	[−0.156; 0.183]
Nationalist Treatment	−0.082*	0.077*	0.005	0.212*
	[−0.156; −0.008]	[0.009; 0.145]	[−0.029; 0.038]	[0.033; 0.390]
R^2	0.013	0.015	0.000	0.011
Adj. R^2	0.010	0.012	−0.003	0.008
Num. obs.	622	622	622	622
RMSE	0.367	0.335	0.177	0.907

* Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

Table 22: Study 1: Treatment Effects on Attack Response Types (Muslim Target)

	Oppose	Ambivalent	Support	Scale
Intercept	0.841*	0.126*	0.034*	1.618*
	[0.790; 0.891]	[0.080; 0.171]	[0.009; 0.059]	[1.496; 1.741]
Control Treatment	−0.030	0.025	0.005	0.003
	[−0.103; 0.044]	[−0.042; 0.092]	[−0.031; 0.041]	[−0.172; 0.178]
Nationalist Treatment	−0.083*	0.069	0.015	0.192*
	[−0.161; −0.006]	[−0.002; 0.139]	[−0.024; 0.053]	[0.005; 0.380]
R^2	0.008	0.006	0.001	0.009
Adj. R^2	0.004	0.003	−0.002	0.006
Num. obs.	619	619	619	619
RMSE	0.397	0.363	0.197	0.951

* Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

Table 23: Study 1: Benjamini-Hochberg Multiple Testing Correction Results

Target - Attack Type	Raw p-value	Adjusted p-value	Significant (Raw)	Significant (Adjusted)
Jewish - Support Attack	0.7787	0.7787	No	No
Jewish - Ambivalent on Attack	0.0276	0.0696	Yes	No
Jewish - Oppose Attack	0.0302	0.0696	Yes	No
Muslim - Support Attack	0.4527	0.5433	No	No
Muslim - Ambivalent on Attack	0.0576	0.0864	No	No
Muslim - Oppose Attack	0.0348	0.0696	Yes	No

C.4 Additional Results

C.4.1 Pooled Models

The pre-test for study 1 varied the organization reporting the attack. The organization was either religious (Jewish or Muslim) or neutral (no affiliation mentioned). Here are the results when we pool both groups.

Table 24: Study 1: Treatment Effects on Attack Response Types (Jewish Target) Neutral and Religious Organization

	Oppose Attack	Ambivalent	Support Attack	Full Scale
Intercept	0.849*	0.105*	0.045*	1.478*
	[0.815; 0.884]	[0.076; 0.135]	[0.025; 0.065]	[1.389; 1.568]
Control Treatment	−0.029	0.024	0.005	0.084
	[−0.079; 0.022]	[−0.020; 0.068]	[−0.024; 0.034]	[−0.044; 0.211]
Nationalist Treatment	−0.073*	0.072*	0.002	0.170*
	[−0.126; −0.021]	[0.025; 0.118]	[−0.027; 0.030]	[0.041; 0.299]
R^2	0.006	0.008	0.000	0.005
Adj. R^2	0.004	0.006	−0.002	0.004
Num. obs.	1260	1260	1260	1260
RMSE	0.388	0.343	0.213	0.956

* Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

Table 25: Study 1: Treatment Effects on Attack Response Types (Muslim Target) Neuteral and Religious Organization

	Oppose Attack	Ambivalent	Support Attack	Full Scale
Intercept	0.820*	0.151*	0.029*	1.598*
	[0.782; 0.857]	[0.116; 0.186]	[0.013; 0.046]	[1.510; 1.685]
Control Treatment	−0.010	0.004	0.007	0.030
	[−0.063; 0.043]	[−0.045; 0.053]	[−0.018; 0.031]	[−0.095; 0.155]
Nationalist Treatment	−0.078*	0.047	0.031*	0.268*
	[−0.134; −0.022]	[−0.004; 0.099]	[0.002; 0.059]	[0.135; 0.402]
R^2	0.007	0.003	0.004	0.015
Adj. R^2	0.006	0.002	0.003	0.014
Num. obs.	1247	1247	1247	1247
RMSE	0.406	0.374	0.200	0.962

* Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

C.4.2 Additional Dependent Measures

Study 1 also included two questions meant to benchmark views about anti-Jewish violence against views about other types of violence using established measures: 1) should the perpetrator of the crime be criminally charged; 2) was the perpetrator justified. The former has been asked in the context of political violence in the U.S. with respondents overwhelmingly being in favor of charging perpetrators (2). We similarly find that respondents are very supportive of suspects facing criminal charges for hate crime attacks (91.2% agree).

The second question mirrors questions asked about anti-refugee hate crime in Germany (targeted predominantly at Muslims) and includes a bias-driven rationale (1). Similar to German respondents, non-negligible shares of U.S. respondents believe hate crimes are sometimes justified (10.6%) or state they do not know whether they are (9.3%).

These distributions do not vary significantly across different treatment conditions.

[Justified] Some people say these attacks are sometimes justified to make it clear that there is a problem with [Jews/Muslims] in this country. Others think they are never justified. What is your view? I think these attacks are...

- Never justified
- Sometimes justified
- Don't know

[Charged] Do you think suspects that commit attacks like these should face criminal charges?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know

Table 26: Study 1: Treatment Effects (Jewish Target) on Charged and Justified

	Charged	Justified
Intercept	1.067*	1.153*
	[1.043; 1.091]	[1.119; 1.188]
Control Treatment	0.022	0.029
	[−0.015; 0.058]	[−0.022; 0.079]
Nationalist Treatment	0.016	0.019
	[−0.020; 0.051]	[−0.031; 0.069]
R^2	0.001	0.001
Adj. R^2	−0.000	−0.001
Num. obs.	1260	1260
RMSE	0.270	0.375

* Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

Table 27: Study 1: Treatment Effects (Muslim Target) on Charged and Justified

	Charged	Justified
Intercept	1.085*	1.220*
	[1.058; 1.112]	[1.179; 1.260]
Control Treatment	0.010	−0.009
	[−0.029; 0.049]	[−0.066; 0.047]
Nationalist Treatment	0.025	0.036
	[−0.016; 0.065]	[−0.022; 0.095]
R^2	0.001	0.002
Adj. R^2	−0.000	0.001
Num. obs.	1247	1247
RMSE	0.296	0.420

* Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

D Study 2

D.1 Sample Demographics

Table 28: Study 2: Demographic Descriptives (Weighted Percentages)

Category	Percentage
Age	
Mean Age	49.1
Education	
Less than High School	3.6%
High school graduate/GED	36.1%
Some college	20.2%
2-year College Degree	9.8%
4-year College Degree	18.8%
Post-graduate Degree	11.5%
Family Income	
Less than $10,000	5.7%
$10,000-$19,999	6.9%
$20,000-$29,999	10.5%
$30,000-$39,999	8.6%
$40,000-$49,999	5.4%
$50,000-$59,999	7.6%
$60,000-$69,999	6.6%
$70,000-$79,999	8.1%
$80,000-$99,999	8.2%
$100,000-$119,999	6.2%
$120,000-$149,999	6.6%
$150,000-$199,999	3.9%
$200,000-$249,999	3.2%
$250,000-$349,999	1.2%
$350,000-$499,999	0.8%
$500,000 or more	0.7%
Prefer not to say	9.7%
Gender	
Male	48.7%
Female	51.3%
Hispanic	
Yes	20.1%
No	79.9%
Party ID	
Democrat	33.4%
Republican	30.3%
Independent	28.5%
Other	4.6%
Other	3.2%
Race	
White	62.8%
Black	12.1%
Hispanic	16.4%
Asian	2.8%
Native American	0.9%
Two or more races	2.6%
Middle Eastern	2.1%
Other	0.3%

D.2 Response Distributions

Table 29: Distribution of Attack Response by Treatment: Anti-Jewish Target (Weighted Percentages)

Response	Control	Religious	Nationalist
Strongly Support	1.6	0.7	0.0
Support	1.4	2.2	0.3
Neither Support nor Oppose	12.4	5.3	16.4
Oppose	13.7	14.4	22.3
Strongly Oppose	71.0	77.4	60.9

Table 30: Distribution of Attack Response by Treatment: Anti-Hindu Target (Weighted Percentages)

Response	Control	Religious	Nationalist
Support	2.4	4.1	1.6
Neither Support nor Oppose	13.3	6.9	23.3
Oppose	23.4	16.8	19.6
Strongly Oppose	60.9	71.5	55.5
Strongly Support	0.0	0.7	0.0

Table 31: Distribution of Attack Response by Treatment: Anti-Muslim Target (Weighted Percentages)

Response	Control	Religious	Nationalist
Strongly Support	2.4	0.0	4.5
Support	1.9	0.8	6.6
Neither Support nor Oppose	14.6	11.6	21.5
Oppose	18.7	13.8	30.1
Strongly Oppose	62.4	73.9	37.4

D.3 Tabular Results

D.3.1 Pure Control

Table 32: Pure Control Baseline: Means and 95% Confidence Intervals

Outcome Variable	Mean	95% CI
Support Attack	0.01	[0.00, 0.02]
Ambivalent on Attack	0.10	[0.05, 0.15]
Oppose Attack	0.89	[0.84, 0.95]
Attacks Scale	4.67	[4.56, 4.79]

D.3.2 Full Models

Table 33: Weighted OLS Models with Robust Standard Errors: Attack Response Types

	Oppose Attack	Ambivalent	Support Attack	Attacks Scale
Intercept	0.918*	0.053*	0.029	4.656*
	[0.873; 0.963]	[0.017; 0.089]	[−0.000; 0.059]	[4.534; 4.777]
Control Treatment	−0.071	0.071*	0.000	−0.144
	[−0.148; 0.006]	[0.003; 0.138]	[−0.040; 0.041]	[−0.337; 0.049]
Nationalist Treatment	−0.085*	0.111*	−0.026	−0.217*
	[−0.161; −0.009]	[0.041; 0.181]	[−0.056; 0.004]	[−0.390; −0.043]
Muslim Target	−0.041	0.062*	−0.021	−0.048
	[−0.109; 0.027]	[0.002; 0.123]	[−0.055; 0.012]	[−0.214; 0.118]
Hindu Target	−0.035	0.016	0.019	−0.114
	[−0.111; 0.041]	[−0.037; 0.069]	[−0.040; 0.078]	[−0.323; 0.094]
Control × Muslim	0.005	−0.040	0.035	−0.096
	[−0.107; 0.117]	[−0.142; 0.063]	[−0.018; 0.088]	[−0.367; 0.174]
Nationalist × Muslim	−0.117	−0.012	0.129*	−0.498*
	[−0.235; 0.001]	[−0.118; 0.094]	[0.066; 0.191]	[−0.773; −0.222]
Control × Hindu	0.031	−0.006	−0.025	0.031
	[−0.084; 0.146]	[−0.103; 0.091]	[−0.094; 0.043]	[−0.256; 0.317]
Nationalist × Hindu	−0.047	0.053	−0.006	−0.034
	[−0.164; 0.071]	[−0.050; 0.156]	[−0.068; 0.055]	[−0.311; 0.242]
R^2	0.035	0.026	0.028	0.060
Adj. R^2	0.031	0.022	0.024	0.056
Num. obs.	1796	1796	1796	1796
RMSE	0.373	0.342	0.182	0.868

* Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

D.3.3 By group

Table 34: Anti-Jewish Target: Treatment Effects on Attack Response Types

	Oppose Attack	Ambivalent	Support Attack	Attacks Scale
Intercept	0.918*	0.053*	0.029	4.656*
	[0.872; 0.963]	[0.017; 0.089]	[−0.000; 0.059]	[4.534; 4.777]
Control Treatment	−0.071	0.071*	0.000	−0.144
	[−0.148; 0.006]	[0.003; 0.139]	[−0.040; 0.041]	[−0.338; 0.049]
Nationalist Treatment	−0.085*	0.111*	−0.026	−0.217*
	[−0.161; −0.009]	[0.040; 0.182]	[−0.056; 0.004]	[−0.390; −0.043]
R^2	0.012	0.021	0.007	0.012
Adj. R^2	0.009	0.017	0.004	0.009
Num. obs.	609	609	609	609
RMSE	0.335	0.310	0.141	0.790

* Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

Table 35: Anti-Hindu Target: Treatment Effects on Attack Response Types

	Oppose Attack	Ambivalent	Support Attack	Attacks Scale
Intercept	0.883*	0.069*	0.049	4.541*
	[0.821; 0.944]	[0.030; 0.108]	[−0.003; 0.100]	[4.371; 4.711]
Control Treatment	−0.040	0.065	−0.025	−0.113
	[−0.125; 0.046]	[−0.005; 0.134]	[−0.080; 0.030]	[−0.325; 0.098]
Nationalist Treatment	−0.132*	0.164*	−0.032	−0.251*
	[−0.222; −0.041]	[0.088; 0.240]	[−0.086; 0.021]	[−0.467; −0.035]
R^2	0.021	0.037	0.007	0.014
Adj. R^2	0.018	0.033	0.003	0.011
Num. obs.	594	594	594	594
RMSE	0.371	0.341	0.167	0.835

* Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

Table 36: Anti-Muslim Target: Treatment Effects on Attack Response Types

	Oppose Attack	Ambivalent	Support Attack	Attacks Scale
Intercept	0.877*	0.116*	0.008	4.607*
	[0.826; 0.927]	[0.067; 0.164]	[−0.008; 0.023]	[4.494; 4.721]
Control Treatment	−0.066	0.031	0.035*	−0.240*
	[−0.148; 0.016]	[−0.046; 0.108]	[0.002; 0.069]	[−0.430; −0.051]
Nationalist Treatment	−0.202*	0.099*	0.103*	−0.714*
	[−0.292; −0.112]	[0.020; 0.179]	[0.047; 0.158]	[−0.929; −0.500]
R^2	0.043	0.013	0.035	0.091
Adj. R^2	0.039	0.010	0.032	0.088
Num. obs.	593	593	593	593
RMSE	0.410	0.372	0.229	0.970

* Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

Table 37: Adjusted p values for effect of nationalism v. religion in Study 2 after Benjamini-Hochberg correction.

Target - Outcome Type	Raw p-value	Adjusted p-value	Significant (Raw)	Significant (Adjusted)
Jewish oppose	0.028	0.034	Yes	Yes
Muslim oppose	0.000	0.000	Yes	Yes
Hindu oppose	0.004	0.009	Yes	Yes
Jewish neither	0.002	0.005	Yes	Yes
Muslim neither	0.014	0.022	Yes	Yes
Hindu neither	0.000	0.000	Yes	Yes
Jewish support	0.091	0.099	No	No
Muslim support	0.000	0.001	Yes	Yes
Hindu support	0.237	0.237	No	No
Jewish attacks	0.014	0.022	Yes	Yes
Muslim attacks	0.000	0.000	Yes	Yes
Hindu attacks	0.023	0.031	Yes	Yes

References

[1] Rafaela Dancygier. Hate crime supporters are found across age, gender, and income groups and are susceptible to violent political appeals. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 120(7):e2212757120, 2023.

[2] Sean J Westwood, Justin Grimmer, Matthew Tyler, and Clayton Nall. Current research overstates american support for political violence. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 119(12):e2116870119, 2022.